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Environmental Ethics and Value
in the World
Many varieties of environmental
rest on the
creatures

have

independent
beings.

idea that
value

nature

ethics

and nature's

in themselves,

value

of their potential use to human

Plants and animals

-- even whole

ecosystems -- are said to have intrinsic value -value over and above whatever

instrumental

value they may have in relation to human wants
and needs. Further, the intrinsic values in nature
are thought to exist independently not only of
the instrumental but of any human valuations
whatever.

The intrinsic values in question are

really or objectively in the world; they are not
projections

of

our

ways

of

valuing

and

conceptualizing things onto a world that in itself
is value-inert.

A truly adequate environmental

ethic requires realism about certain kinds of
value.
Unfortunately,

serious problems afflict

this realism about value, as philosophers have
known at least since the 17th Century, and it is
not clear whether any of the leading varieties of
environmental ethics has succeeded in solving
them (or perhaps even faced them).
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One such

problem is that the so-called objective values
seem not to be derivable from any facts, and not
reducible to them either, so that the values
appear not to be determined by anything about
which there clearly is a fact of the matter.
Another problem is that attributing value to a
thing seems to yield no empirically

testable

prediction about it, and no explanation of its
behavior, beyond what we already know from
the relevant factual sciences.

Hence many

conclude that the talk of intrinsic value or
"enchantment"

in the world is groundless if not

obscurantist.
I am inclined to agree with much of this;
those who would reenchant the world may have
underestimated
expression

the

challenge,

in the question,

which

"In

finds

a world of

scientific law, how can one speak of intrinsic
value?"

Or as Morris Berman says, can those

who live in a scientific world "affirm intrinsic
meaning and value in the natural order? ... Is a
theology

of nature

science?"

Or

"disenchantment
world view"?

compatible
must

we

with natural
conclude

that

is [inherent in] the scientific
If so, we may have to give up

enchantment or give up science.
I think we can have both enchantment
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and science.

But in order to see why we can

have both, it is necessary to understand just
what the challenge to us reenchanters is, why it
has been so nearly insurmountable, and wherein
previous efforts to meet the challenge may have
failed. Then we need some positive account of
just how those who live in a scientific world can
affirm, after all, intrinsic value.

The argument

will be not merely that such reenchantment is
logically consistent with an austere scientific
naturalism, but that we may form a synthesis ()f
the two, a synthesis in which each enriches the
other while correcting

the other's

occasional

extremes.
The first step toward reenchanting the
world is to get values back into it. So long as
values are merely the projections of our desires
or schemes onto a normatively inert world, or
merely

our

internal

response

to

causal

stimulation by the world, we cannot affirm the
needed intrinsic value in the natural order, and
the world cannot be said, in the intended,
objective sense, to contain an element of value.
So let's

reflect

awhile on how the values

disappeared from the world in the first place.
They disappeared in the 17th century, or
at least were well on the way to disappearing,
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when the world began to be identified with what
could be expressed in the language of natural
science.

Since no value judgment is derivable

from or reducible to such language, or so it
came to seem, it looked as though the world
could contain no telos, no purposes or proper
functions.
the

Instead, the world was nothing but

objective

Descartes's

world

mechanism

teleology.

of matter

in motion.

displaced

Aristotle's

Indeed all kinds of value seemed

banished from nature, along with much else that
we cherish. All efforts to get the values back in
have appeared unconvincing, evidently because
it has seemed that, as Huston Smith once put it,
"any objective description of the world would
have to be value-free."

Indeed no such effort

can possibly succeed, so long as the world is
identified

with

the

totality

of

objective

descriptive fact, and the only sense in which the
world could contain or manifest an element of
v;\lue is by way of derivability from such fact.
What underlies this history is a set of
assumptions and inferences that add up to what
J.

L.

Mackie

queerness":

calls

"the

argument

from

objective values would have to be

very queer sorts of things, because their relation
with facts is so mysterious,

being a matter
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neither of logical derivation, nor of reduction or
definability, nor even of supervenience.

Better

by far to replace the alleged objective values
with some sort of subjective response that can
be causally related to stimulation by the natural
features on which the alleged values are said to
be resultant

or consequential.

Or so the

argument goes.
Mackie
argument

from

himself
queerness

explains
is

why

the

indispensable.

Without some such argument, the mere fact of
widespread normative disagreement does not by
itself imply there are no objective values about
which to disagree, no more than disagreement in
science implies there really is no truth of the
matter there. Or as Robert Nozick remarks, "It
is because we do not see how an objective ethics
is possible that we worry about irresolvable
[normative] disagreements."

And as Nicholas

Sturgeon argues, anyone who finds it plausible
that objective values play no explanatory role in
our account of the world must already have been
persuaded by some other consideration that there
are in the first place no objective values to play
the role.

Indeed if anything, the presumption

should be that there are objective values.

For

this is what ordinary usage of normative terms
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overwhelmingly

presupposes,

as does most of

our actual normative reasoning, including those
of our

explanations

that

appeal

to

moral

properties (as in 'Hitler's depravity explains his
universal condemnation').

Hence as Mackie

sees, subjectivists like himself are compelled to
advance an error thesis: our ordinary usage and
reasoning,

entrenched

massively

for

millennia,

are

in error, for there really are no

objective values.

And Mackie is far more

candid than most subjectivists in acknowledging
that the burden of proof is on those who
advance any such thesis.

The argument from

queerness is meant to discharge this burden.
It follows that if we can undermine the
argument from queerness, by showing the falsity
of one of its assumptions, then not only is the
presumption
undefeated,

that there are objective

we are free to treat ordinary usage

and normative
significant

values

reasoning

independent

and explanation
evidence

as

against

subjectivism. If we can undermine the argument
from queerness, by showing how objective value
is possible, we need not worry so deeply about
irresolvable normative

disagreements

and the

occasional seeming irrelevance or impotence of
normative explanations of various admitted facts.
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Without

the

argument

from

queerness,

or

something very like it, subjectivism has little to
be said for it.
The way to undermine the argument from
queerness is to show that there is an alternative
to the relations it lists as the only possible
relations between facts and values. The unlisted
relation is nonreductive determination.

That is,

even if values are not related to facts by some
sort of logical derivation or reduction, still they
might be related by nonreductive determination.
But what precisely is this relation of
nonreductive determination?

When we say one

thing determines another, we mean that given
the way the first is, there is only one way the
second can be.

Here is a concrete example.

The function of your heart is to pump blood;
pumping blood is what the heart is supposed to
do, but may fail to do, one of its shoulds or
oughts.
normative

What determines
function

of

that this is the
the

teleofunction, as it is called?

heart

its

According to a

leading theory of the matter, the teleofunction of
the heart is to pump blood because it was by
pumping blood that past hearts (or enough of
them) enabled containing organisms to survive
and reproduce at rates higher than those without
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them, this prior successful performance thereby
enabling the production of today's hearts. The
trait selected for was one responsible

for a

mechanism that pumps, and your heart has the
function of pumping blood -- it is supposed to
pump blood -- in virtue of being a descendant in
a "reproductively
in which

established family" of items

a critical

proportion

of ancestors

performed that function, your heart having been
produced

in significant

enough they did.
devices

that

part

because

often

The proportion of ancestor

performed

successfully

can

sometimes be tiny; in this sense the devices can
be quite unreliable yet contribute just enough to
enable survival and reproduction.

Hardly any of

the seeds of the wild fig in its jungle habitat
manage to start new trees; the seeds are nearly
all consumed

by animals,

insects

or other

mishap. Nonetheless, they have the function of
starting new trees.1
What determines

what your heart is

supposed to do is a natural-selective history of
relations to an environment, a history in which
your heart is a late arrival. It is not determined
by a mechanism.

To make this vivid, suppose

that by some cosmic accident a collection of
molecules hitherto in random motion were to

********** 8 **********

coalesce to form an exact physical duplicate of
your

heart,

the

microparticle.

same
Or

down

imagine

to

the

the

last

duplicate

achieved by some prodigious feat of technology
(beam me up my heart-copy, Scotty).

Because

the history of the duplicate is wrong -- it is not
a descendant, not in the family -- it would not
be a heart (it would not be a member of the
biological kind "heart"),

even though it would

of course have all the physical powers and
dispositions of your heart.

What determines

whether an object has the normative function is
the natural-selective historical matter of being a
descendant

in

a

reproductively

established

family of objects in which a critical proportion
of ancestors pumped blood. It is not determined
by the physical states of the object alone, or by
the physical structure or dispositions
particles

that compose

of the

it, but only by the

relevant natural-selective history.
The point is fundamental, recurring all
the way down to the molecular level.

Certain

sequences of amino-acid molecules, called signal
sequences, have the teleofunction of acting as
precursors

to certain proteins

and mediating

where they go when fully synthesized -- some to
the

mitochondria,

some

to

the

********** 9 **********

plasma

membrane, some to the chloroplasts, and so on.2
The trait of being a signal sequence is a function
trait, a matter of what the sequences of aminoacid molecules are supposed to do but may fail
to do, depending in part on what is happening
elsewhere in the cell.

Whether a sequence of

molecules is a signal sequence is not determined
by the physical structure or dispositions of the
particles that compose the sequence, but only by
the relevant natural-selective history.
So we see illustrated in biology how
there is an intelligible alternative to the relations
listed in the argument from queerness, which
underlies

the

widespread

suspicion

normativity from the 17th century on.

of
The

normative function of your heart is not derivable
from or reducible to its physical properties; the
mechanists were right about this.

What the

mechanists did not see, and still do not, is that
normative function is nonreductively determined
by a natural-selective
wider

environment.

history of relations to a
This

argument from queerness

undermines

the

-- provided certain

familiar objections can be met which we will
consider in a moment.
But first recall the consequences
undermining

the

argument

from

of

queerness .

•••••••••• 10 ••••••••••

Once the argument is undermined, not only is
the presumption of objectivity undefeated, we
are free to treat various
normative

reasoning

facts about actual

and

other

usage

of

normative language, including the explanatory,
as significant
subjectivism.

independent

evidence

against

For without some such argument

as the one from queerness, the mere fact of
normative disagreement does not imply there are
no objective values about which to disagree, and
subjectivists have no way of discharging the
burden of proving their error thesis (that our
normal

normative

reasoning

and

usage,

entrenched for millennia, are massively in error).
Now for the objections.
object

that

teleofunction

a

thing's

yields

no

Someone might

having

a

prediction

certain
of

its

behavior. After all, that the heart's teleofunction
is to pump blood does not by itself imply that a
given heart will pump blood; a particular heart
may be so deformed, diseased or damaged as to
be totally incapable of doing so.

Nor does a

thing x's having a certain function F imply even
that there is a substantial

probability x will

perform F; remember all those fig seeds.

But,

the objection continues, empirical science must
yield

testable

predictions;

since
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attributing

teleofunction does not, talk of teleofunction is
insufficiently empirical.
The problem with this objection is that
biologists typically are interested in how a thing
would behave if it were functioning normally
and in conditions for which it was designed
(where both the notion of normality and of
design are given the natural-selective
sketched above).

account

To attribute to the heart the

function of pumping blood, then, is among other
things to predict how it would behave if it were
behaving normally and under design conditions.
A related objection

is that attributing

function does no explanatory work.

After all,

saying that x is supposed to F explains neither

x's actual behavior

(since

as seen nothing

follows about x's actual behavior from x's being
supposed to F), nor the behavior of other things
causally affected by x (for the same reason).
The trouble with this objection is that attributing
F does

do explanatory

work,

as follows.

Biologists typically are interested in what causal
effects x would have if x were functioning
normally

and under design conditions.

attribute

to the

heart

the teleofunction

pumping

blood,

then,

is to give

explanation

of the behavior

To
of

a causal

of those things
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affected by the heart assuming it is functioning
normally and under design conditions.
At this point
tempted,

irresistibly,

many

people

will be

to raise a number

traditional objections

of

to equating normativity

with any descriptive affair whatever.

One such

objection

argument.

is

the

open

question

According to the open-question argument against
utilitarianism, for example, utilitarians propose
equating moral goodness with conduciveness to
the greatest happiness of the greatest number; in
every conceptually possible world, x is morally
good iff x conduces to the greatest happiness of
the

greatest

number.

But,

the

argument

continues, we can easily imagine ourselves both
recognizing that some act or policy x conduces
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
and yet also wondering whether x is morally
good.

Therefore,

the two traits cannot be

equivalent after all (or at least it is an open
question whether

they are).

That is, open-

question arguments infer from the imaginability
of

a

certain

possibility,
conceptually

or

situation

to

its

conceptual

at

to

there

being

least

possible

relevant conditions

world

in which

the

obtain but the proposed

equivalence does not.

**********
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But consider:
teleofunctional

What the theory

of

normativity presents is not an

analysis of normativity

in general or of the

normative trait N in particular

(whether

the

analysis is of a concept, ordinary usage, correct
usage, our intuitions, or phenomenology).

The

theory presents this no more than Einstein's
theory of mass presents
ordinary

concept

an anal ysis of the

of mass,

or even

of a

physicists' concept. Objections to the effect that
no one ever meant anything like this naturalselective historical business when they spoke of
shoulds and oughts

even basic biological

shoulds and oughts

are as misguided

as

objections to Einstein that no one ever meant by
'mass' anything not conserved in all interactions.
To require that an Einstein proceed by giving
analyses of existing

concepts

or established

usage (in or out of physics), or at least that he
not use terms fundamentally at odds with such
usage, would block his revisionary theory of
mass, and indeed a host of other revisionary if
not revolutionary

theories

in or out of the

sciences.
It follows that given a theoretical term
like 'mass' -- or theoretical normative terms like
'teleofunction'

and 'supposed to pump blood' --
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the relation between the tenn and what defines
or explains it is not a relation of conceptually
necessary equivalence, not even broadly logical
or metaphysical equivalence; it is not meant to
hold in every metaphysically possible world, let
alone in every world

we can imagine

or

conceive. The claim is only that the equivalence
holds in the physically possible worlds (those in
which the objects obey the laws of physics), or
else in a subset of the physically

possible

worlds; what happens in the rest is left open.
For example, so far as the empirical evidence
for the theory of teleofunction allows us to say,
the equivalence of 'is supposed to pump blood'
and 'occurs in a natural-selective
history

having

reproductive

such-and-such

physical

characteristics' is true in the subset of physically
possible worlds in which conditions obtain that
are necessary for there to be natural-selective
reproductive

histories (or more narrowly, for

certain kinds of them; such conditions include
sufficient stability in the reproductive "stuff'
for it to reproduce, sufficient stability in the
environment for favorable adaptation to get a
grip, and so on; all bets are off in physically
possible worlds that are too chaotic, too hot,
whatever).
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This claim only of equivalence in subsets
of physically

possible worlds disarms open-

question arguments

against equivalence

of a

normative trait with some descriptive or physical
trait. Open-question arguments mayor may not
be effective against utilitarianism.

But they fail

spectacularly

equivalences

against theoretical

meant only to hold in subsets of the physically
possible worlds. Even if the mere imaginability
of a situation entails its conceptual possibility (it
may well

not), nothing

follows

situation's physical possibility.
intuitions

are notoriously

as to the

Our armchair

poor indicators

of

physical possibility (that is, of what the laws of
physics actually allow). So too are our armchair
concepts.

Nothing follows as to the physical

possibility of a situation from its conceptual
possibility,

or

even

from

the

conceptual

possibility of its physical possibility.
Another
equivalence
descriptive

traditional
of

objection

normativity

with

affair is that no ought

to any
some
can be

logically derived from any is. This too is not
even to the point, which is not that a basic
normative teleofunctional

trait can be derived

from the descriptive matter of occurring in a
natural-selective

reproductive

**********
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history
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having

such-and-such

physical

characteristics.

The

point, rather, is that by assuming the equivalence
of the two in a subset of the physically possible
worlds,

we

are

enabled

to

construct

an

empirically adequate theory of teleofunction and
of much else.
Still another objection has to do with
identity.

=

If N

necessarily N

=

E, the objection goes, then

=

E; N

E in every logically

So if for some x we can

possible world.

imagine that Ex but not Nx, then N
'Trouble

is,

the

theory

;II!

E after all.

of

normative

teleofunctional traits does not claim anything so
strong as identity.

All it claims is equivalence

of Nand E in a subset of the physically possible
worlds,

which

hardly

guarantees

identity.

Further, even if identity were claimed, it could
be contingent identity; that N

=

E would not

entail that N = E in every logically possible
world, or even in every physically
world.

possible

Finally, it's not at all clear that the

present E -- the descriptive matter of occurring
in a natural-selective reproductive history having
such-and-such

physical characteristics

-- is a

genuine physical property of x in the first place.
On

some

propertyhood

notions
it is not.

of

genuine

physical

Unless they can be
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excluded, we should not glibly assume that E is
a genuine property of x, or even a genuine
relational property of x. True, what determines
x has N is a descriptive

whether

matter

involving x. But it does not follow that whether

x has N is determined by a descriptive property
of x, even a relational property of x.

In fact

there are cases in which x's having N is
determined not by x's own physical properties
and relations, but only by these together with the
physical properties of some item y that bears no
physical relation to x that does any work in
determining N.
Suppose, in light of the discussion so far,
we are entitled to construe the most basic kind
of normativity as equivalent to a teleofunctional
property N that x has when x is a member of a
first-order

reproductively

which proliferated,

established

family

survived and enabled the

production of x because a critical proportion of

x's ancestors performed N. This may seem a
very long way from intrinsic values of the kind
that environmental ethicists require. How do we
get from basic, teleo functional normativity to
intrinsic values?
In a crucial sense we already have them.
Environmental ethicists want intrinsic value in
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the sense at least of value in nature that exists
independently of any potential use to humans,
value over and above any instrumental value
something may have in relation to human wants
and needs.

And teleofunctional

values

are

intrinsic in this sense. For example, whether the
spotted owl's heart is supposed to pump blood - whether

this is what it should

do -- is

determined by a natural selective history quite
independent of human wants and needs. So too
for the teleofunctional

values of indefinitely

many other species and their organs, behaviors
and more.
But let's see if we can go further. Start
by thinking about rules, and about behavior that
is supposed to conform to a rule.

Consider the

honey bee, and suppose we want to understand
the role of bee dances in the life of the hive,
which role, biologists theorize, contributed to the
evolutionary

success

of the bees.

Careful

observation and experiment reveal that the dance
is a complex that consists not only of wing
beats,

steps

and

waggles

having

specific

frequencies and orientations, but of bits of nectar
and pollen that adhere to the dancing forager
bees and tell the waiting bees about the kind and
quality of nectar to expect at a certain distance

********** 19 **********

and

direction.3

That

is,

dance-complex

variations map onto specific combinations

of

direction, distance, kind and quantity of nectar,
the mapping being a necessary causal factor in
the waiting bees'

being enabled to find the

nectar (or to find this nectar rather than some
lower in quality or quantity).

This in tum

provides significant support for the hypothesis
that past dance complexes which did map were
selected for (or rather that the mechanisms
which produced them in appropriate conditions,
often enough, were selected for, or at least the
genotypes responsible

for these mechanisms).

Granted the hypothesis, and given the naturalselective theory of proper function, one of the
proper functions of the complexes is to map
onto direction, distance, kind and quantity of
nectar.
Now think of the inward-bound

bee-

dance rule. For vividness, let's say the rule is,
"When nectar occurs at such-and-such direction
and distance, dance Opus II, no. 4."
outward-bound

For the

bees, the rule to which their

behavior is to conform is, "When they dance
Opus II, no. 4, fly such-and-such direction and
distance."

(Of course the actual rules are far

more complex.)

That there are such rules, and

********** 20 **********

which ones there are, are objective matters we
discover empirically, by discovering what is the
rule

conformity

to

which,

by

a

critical

proportion of ancestor behaviors, explains how
past bees -- or enough of them -- managed to
find nectar and proliferate. The rules discovered
in this way represent unexpressed purposes the
behavior has, indeed purposes of which the
organism need not, and typically could not be
aware, and which are not to be found by peering
into its head. Instead, to say that the organism
has such a purpose is to say that it "has within
[it] a genetically determined mechanism of a
kind that historically proliferated

[among the

ancestors] in part because it was

organism's

responsible for producing conformity to the ...
rule.,,4
Some rules have to do with repeated
interactions
conspecific

among

organisms,

or alien.

In many

whether
cases

the

encounters are dangerous for one or both parties
-- eat or be eaten, fight or flee, fight or stand
off, exploit or cooperate.

Often the history of

encounter

amounts

to an iterated prisoner's

dilemma.

For the sake of simplicity, suppose

the rule of encounter conformity to which best
promotes the organism's fitness (or perhaps its

********** 21 **********

genes') is the Tit-for-Tat rule: cooperate at the
first encounter, thereafter do whatever the other
did in the previous

encounter.

(There are

important cases where other rules do better/
the relevant

encounter

situations,

what

In
the

organism is supposed to do -- what it should or
ought to do -- is behave in conformity to the
Tit-for-Tat rule.

Call this "ought"

moral

In

ought.

the

relevant

a protoencounter

situations, behavior in conformity to the Tit-forTat rule has the property of being proto-morally
obligatory;

behavior

contrary

to the rule is

proto-morally wrong. And we may say that the
organisms with which the given organism should
cooperate enjoys a corresponding

proto-moral

considerabili ty.
Now many organisms are designed to
learn. This means that instead of coming wired
by evolution to be predisposed to behave (often
enough) in accordance with the Tit-for-Tat rule,
or with some other proto-moral rule(s), they may
learn so to behave (or to be so disposed) and to
pass on what they learn to their offspring.6
"What an organism does in accordance with
evolutionary

design can be very novel and

surprising, for the more complex of nature's
creatures

can

learn."?

They

can
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acquire

biological purposes -- things they are supposed
to do

--

"that

individuals,

are

peculiar

tailored

to

their

circumstances and histories."s
case,

a

proto-moral

nonreductively

to them
own

peculiar

In this kind of

property

determined

as

may

be

not by a natural-

selective reproductive history having such-andsuch physical characteristics, but only by such a
history together with the relevant novel features
to which the proto-moral rule is to apply.
For example,

consider

another proto-

moral rule, the Limited Altruism rule: Behave
altruistically toward kin (say toward those whose
genes are sufficiently

like yours).

Upon the

birth of your first child -- call her Sarah -- it's
clear that in order to conform to the Limited
Altruism rule, you have to conform to the rule,
"Behave altruistically toward Sarah."

This is

what is called a derived rule, and you learn a
new competence

-- to behave

altruistically

toward Sarah -- in order to conform to it.
Because Sarah is unique -- never before has this
individual

existed,

and never again -- you

acquire a proto-moral duty that is new under the
sun: Love

Sarah.

corresponding

And
kind

Sarah
of

acquires

proto-moral

considerability.
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a

The normativity here is a case of adapted
teleofunction.9

Your being supposed to love

Sarah is a matter not of something's

being a

member of a reproductively established family
having the appropriate natural-selective history,
but only of this together with the relevant novel
feature -- the new-born

Sarah to whom the

proto-moral rule is to apply. The normativity is
therefore a kind of non-basic normativity.
normative teleofunction

The

of being supposed to

love Sarah is derived from the teleofunction of
those genetically produced devices in us that
historically

proliferated

in part because they

were

responsible

for producing

(often

enough)

to the proto-moral

Altruism rule.

conformity
Limited

And as before, the normativity

here is proof against the traditional objections to
objective normativity.
Note that in an important sense, this
imperative to love Sarah is categorical. The rule
commands you to love Sarah, period.

It says

nothing about any of your desired ends, such as
happiness, nor does it condition the love on any
other motive you may have (or on Sarah's
behavior). On the other hand, the normativity is
derived from that of the devices in us that
historically

proliferated
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in part because they
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produced

conformity

(often enough)

Umited Altruism rule.

to the

In this sense, though

only in this sense, the normativity of the rule -its imperative force -- is not independent of all
facts about human nature or circumstance.

If a

categorical imperative must be independent of
all such facts, then of course the imperative to
love Sarah is hypothetical only. But why should
anyone insist on such miserably
categorical ness in the first place?

Draconian

Better to say

that the imperative to love Sarah is categorical,
in that the imperative is not conditioned on any
motive you may have.
To pave the way for another and still
richer kind of non-basic normativity, note that
human beings are designed not only to learn but
to speak and listen, and that among our language
devices

are conventional

such as "I christen thee
such-and-such

introducing-devices
," "Let us call

," "Let the rule be pawn

can take en passant," and so on. Humans are
able not only to conform to rules -- quite
primitive creatures can do that -- but to express
the rules and make up new ones. Conventional
introducing-devices

have a relational stabilizing

function such that, given something to fill the
blank, and given the appropriate context, they
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acquire an adapted function to cause what fills
the blank to perform a certain function (of being
the name of the christened infant, of being a rule
for the pawn, etc.).

Performance of this latter

function is then a derived teleofunction of the
words in the blank -- derived from the function
of the introducing device.

(Often it will not

long remain a derived teleo function. As soon as
the words are used and continue to be used in
part because using them in this way works for
partner hearers and speakers, the words acquire
a direct teleofunction.

So too for the newly

coined rules they may express.)lO
Now suppose it occurs to some especially
thoughtful
Altruism

tribal
rule

member

should

Unlimited Altruism:

that

be

the Limited

supplemented

by

Be altruistic to everyone,

not just kin or members of your tribe or nation;
love one another, regardless.
here is non-basic, clearly.

The normativity
Indeed 'Love one

another' is a fully moral rule, not proto-moral,
and the

imperative

it expresses,

like

imperative to love Sarah, is categorical.

the

Yet its

normativity, like proto-moral normativity, is a
species of teleofunctional
Basically

because,

normativity.

despite

the rule's

Why?
being

completely new under the sun, its discovery,
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enunciation, and the competence to conform to
it are straightforward applications of capacities
that have robust teleofunctions,
function

of the

teleofunctions

rule

so that the

is derived

from

the

of the devices that produced it

and the ability to conform to it. In this sense,
fully

moral

normativity

teleofunctional

is

normativity,

a
just

species

of

as adapted

proper function is a species of proper function.
And as before, the traditional objections to the
normativity fail.
Taking

now a further

leap, suppose

someone concludes that all living things, not just
humans, should be, if not altruistic toward all
species, then at least disposed to give significant
weight to their interests.

Hunter-gatherers have

seen that failure to do so leads in the not so
long

run

to

environmental

degradation

destructive to all. Suppose further that the rule
the hunter-gathers thus express in language -and in ritual -- and bring to consciousness, is in
fact a rule to which

all organisms

should

conform, and indeed, except for humans, they
have

within

mechanisms

them
of

a

genetically

determined

kind

historically

that

proliferated (among the organisms' ancestors) in
part

because

they
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responsible
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for

producing, often enough, conformity to the rule.
Then

we

could

say

that

every

organism

whatever, sentient or not, has a corresponding
moral considerability.
Further, this moral considerability would
be intrinsic, in the sense that it is not derived
from human wants or needs, and not grounded
in human conventions.

It would not be the

result of expanding the domain of beings having
moral standing from a basis in human being.
Rather,

it would

be

grounded

independently of human valuation.

in

nature,

The moral

considerability of all creatures would not be a
mere projection of our ways of valuing and
conceptualizing things. This may not be all that
is necessary to reenchant the world, but it is a
significant step in the right direction.
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NOTES
1. The detailed theory of proper function behind
this sketch, as well as the definition of
"reproductively established family," occurs in
Millikan (1984), Chs. 1-2, and Millikan (1993b),
passim.
2. The example is from Kincaid (1990), who
develops it in greater detail (though to a
different end).
3. Kirchner and Towne (1994) provide an
accessible introduction with references. None of
this is to suggest that the bee dances form a
language.
Cf. Millikan (1984), 40ff, 96-97;
Wenner (1990).
4. Millikan (1993a), 219. Cf. Millikan (1990);
Post (1991), 49-55.
5. Cf. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Axelrod
(1984); Axelrod and Dion (1988); Kitcher
(1993), which contains further references.
6. Indeed some of them may learn what Dennett
calls a Good Trick -- a behavioral talent that
enhances their chances dramatically -- which
when combined with the Baldwin Effect can
reflect back on and accelerate the process of
genetic evolution. Cf. Dennett (1991), 184 ff.
7. Millikan (1989), 292.
8. Millikan (1993a), 226.
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9. Millikan (1984), 40f.
10. Millikan (1984), 81-82.
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